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ABSTRACT
A key problem in research on adversarial examples is that vulnerability to adver-
sarial examples is usually measured by running attack algorithms. Because the
attack algorithms are not optimal, the attack algorithms are prone to overestimat-
ing the size of perturbation needed to fool the target model. In other words, the
attack-based methodology provides an upper-bound on the size of a perturbation
that will fool the model, but security guarantees require a lower bound. CLEVER
is a proposed scoring method to estimate a lower bound. Unfortunately, an esti-
mate of a bound is not a bound. In this report, we show that gradient masking, a
common problem that causes attack methodologies to provide only a very loose
upper bound, causes CLEVER to overestimate the size of perturbation needed to
fool the model. In other words, CLEVER does not resolve the key problem with
the attack-based methodology, because it fails to provide a lower bound.
1 INTRODUCTION
A key problem in research on adversarial examples is that vulnerability to adversarial examples is
usually measured by running attack algorithms (Szegedy et al., 2014). Because the attack algorithms
are not optimal, the attack algorithms are prone to overestimating the size of perturbation needed to
fool the target model. In other words, the attack-based methodology provides an upper-bound on
the size of a perturbation that will fool the model, but security guarantees require a lower bound.
CLEVER (Weng et al., 2018) is a proposed scoring method to estimate a lower bound. In this report,
we show that gradient masking, a common problem that causes attack methodologies to provide
only a very loose upper bound, causes CLEVER to overestimate the size of perturbation needed to
fool the model. In other words, CLEVER does not resolve the key problem with the attack-based
methodology, because it fails to provide a lower bound.
2 CLEVER
CLEVER is based on estimating the local Lipschitz constant of a model represented by a function f
applied to an input x. The estimate is formed by observing p-norms of the gradient, ∇x‖f(x)‖p at
Ns random sampled points x. These observations are then used to form a statistical estimate of the
local Lipschitz constant.
CLEVER is only intended to be applied to Lipschitz-continous functions.
3 COUNTEREXAMPLE ALLOWING FOR INFINITE PRECISION
First, we show that CLEVER can underestimate the local Lipschitz constant, even in a theoretical
setting, where we assume CLEVER is able to represent real numbers with unlimited precision.
Suppose that we have some function g which has a large local Lipschitz constant at some input x.
For example, g could be a typical neural network with no defenses against adversarial examples.
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Define f(x) = g(h(x)), where h(x) is a staircase function, rounding the input to a set of quantized
values. One example of such a staircase function is
h(x) =
ceil(cx)
c
,
where c is a hyperparameter determining how many levels to quantize each unit interval into.
Because the function h has zero gradient “almost everywhere” our Ns samples of x will all observe
zero gradient of f “almost surely”. Here “almost everywhere” and “almost surely” are used in the
measure theoretic sense, meaning that they hold except for a set of measure zero.
Having observed no gradient of f , the CLEVER score will regard f as constant, even though by
construction (we assumed g is highly sensitive to its input) it is not. This shows that CLEVER will
conclude the model is highly robust, even though it is not.
There is one problem with this example though: the function f is not Lipschitz continuous.
CLEVER is intended only for Lipschitz continuous functions. This difficulty can be resolved by
approximating the staircase function h with a Lipschitz continuous function hˆ. For example, instead
of a staircase function that increases with linear jumps, use a staircase-like function that increases
with linear ramps of width δ, as illustrated in Figure 1. As δ → 0, the probability of CLEVER
observing a non-zero gradient with finite NS becomes arbitrarily small.
4 IMPLEMENTATION ON DIGITAL COMPUTERS
The problems in the previous section are applicable even if CLEVER is able to represent real num-
bers with unlimited precision.
In practice, because CLEVER is a metric to be used in experiments, CLEVER must be regarded as
a form of software that executes on a digital computer to evaluate finite-precision machine learning
models, rather than as an abstract function applied to abstract real-valued variables.
In a digital computer, every function is either constant or it is not Lipschitz continuous, because the
rounding to a finite number of bits means that any function that increases or decrease does so in
discrete jumps. Because of this, it is not possible to satisfy the conditions of the theory for CLEVER
in actual usage.
When CLEVER is used on a digital computers, it can be prone to various difficult-to-predict fail-
ures. For example, sigmoid units in the network may saturate to the point that the gradient through
them is numerically rounded to machine zero. This would cause an effect similar to the staircase
example above, with the sharp sigmoid function appearing not to be Lipschitz continuous due to
numerical error, and the function appearing to CLEVER to be extremely robust due to the lack of
observed gradient. Numerical saturation of sigmoid units has already been observed to interfere with
attack-based benchmarking of defenses against adversarial examples (Brendel & Bethge, 2017) and
CLEVER does not resolve this problem.
5 SILENT FAILURES
CLEVER is not intended for use on functions that are not Lipschitz continuous, but numerical error
in digital computers can cause functions that are Lipschitz continuous in theory to be far from
Lipschitz continuous in practice. CLEVER does not offer a mechanism to detect when this happens.
It may be possible to get reasonable estimates from CLEVER if the user of CLEVER is aware of the
problems causing loss of gradient and can mitigate them (e.g., by removing the staircase function
h proposed in Section 3). Unfortunately, inaccuracies resulting from numerical error are difficult to
characterize, anticipate, or detect, so a user of CLEVER who obtains a good score will not know
whether the model is robust or whether CLEVER has returned an inaccurate estimate without raising
a warning that the method is not applicable to the current model.
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Figure 1: The staircase function hwith c = 255 steps per unit interval, and the Lipschitz continuous
approximation hˆ using linear ramps of width δ set to 5× smaller than the step width. In the upper,
zoomed out view, both h and hˆ resemble the identity function. In the lower, zoomed in view, we see
that h in fact has a derivative of zero almost everywhere. The Lipschitz continuous approximation of
hˆ has a derivative of zero with probability 1−δ at points sampled uniformly at random. By shrinking
δ further we can make the probability of observing nonzero derivatives arbitrarily small. Inserting
this function anywhere in a model will not interfere with the operation of the model (beyond reducing
its precision to 8 bits for c = 255) but will prevent CLEVER from observing nonzero gradient with
arbitrarily high probability.
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6 CONCLUSION
The use of the staircase function described in Section 3 and the various numerical difficulties de-
scribed in Section 4 are all examples of gradient masking (Papernot et al., 2017). Gradient masking
is any defense against adversarial examples that works by breaking attack algorithms by making the
gradient useless (small or pointed in the wrong direction, too noisy, combined with a poorly con-
ditioned Hessian, etc.). A key flaw in the methodology of evaluating defenses against adversarial
examples by testing them against attacks is that the attacks can fail when the defender (intention-
ally or unintentionally, knowingly or unknowingly) uses gradient masking. This report shows that
CLEVER suffers from the same flaw as the attack-based methodology, and does not actually offer a
lower bound on the size of perturbation required to fool the model.
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